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Meta-analysis as Judgment Aggregation 
1. Introduction 
The way to approximate total evidence in a wide range of contemporary disciplines, 
including medical, educational and behavioural sciences, goes by the name of meta-
analysis.  Typically, medical and social science literature abounds with contradictory 
results on the same issue:  Does vitamin E prevent heart attacks?  Does psychotherapy 
really help people?  Do government sponsored job training programs work?  Despair 
over the growing body of conflicting results on such questions was a staple of human 
sciences until the third quarter of the twentieth century, when the practice of meta-
analysis promised to deliver a principled way of resolving conflict among experts.  In 
the passionate assessment of the psychologist Frank Schmidt this new meta-analytic 
practice shows that  
scientific progress is possible.  It means that cumulative understanding and 
progress in theory development is possible after all.  It means that the 
behavioral and social sciences can attain the status of true sciences; they are 
not doomed forever to the status of quasi-sciences or pseudosciences.  One 
result of this is that the gloom, cynicism, and nihilism that have enveloped 
many in the behavioral and social sciences is lifting.  Young people starting 
out in the behavioral and social sciences today can hope for a much brighter 
future. (Schmidt 1996, 123).  
Over the last three decades, the use of meta-analytic tools has grown at a breakneck 
pace, corresponding to the equally explosive rate of growth in epidemiological 
research and other experimental studies in human sciences.  Integrating evidence by 
these new quantitative techniques has replaced traditional discursive reviews in social 
and medical sciences, for it is also claimed that meta-analyses correct for the bias of 
the reviewer, and help discount misleading evidence as the extant data are merged in a 
systematic manner.   
The first such study is traced back to the work of the psychologist Gene V. 
Glass who in the 1970s sought to assess the effectiveness of psychotherapy by 
undertaking a quantitative review of numerous studies carried out to this end.  Ever 
since, Glass’s procedure has inspired statisticians—both the theoretical ones and the 
data-analysts—who have been developing more refined mathematical techniques to 
integrate evidence.  Nowadays equipped with meta-analysis software, the outcome of 
this activity is what some researchers describe as a meta-analytic revolution.  Meta-
analyses set new standards of excellence on what counts as strong evidence.  While 
the evidence-based medicine manuals crown this method as the best way of 
summarizing different research findings, more and more headlines about medical 
research come from meta-analytic findings.1  In the current prevailing mood in 
medical and behavioural sciences, it is only a properly conducted, up-to-date meta-
analysis that licenses detachment of hypotheses from the host of evidential claims 
made in individual studies, which claims may be deemed inconclusive or 
contradictory with each other.   
The meta-analytic procedures achieve this detachment by aggregating 
available statistical evidence on what the statistician D.B. Rubin calls, in some degree 
of abstraction, a response surface (Rubin 1992).  In Rubin’s account, each primary 
                                                        
1 In the EBM hierarchy of types of evidence, systematic reviews (SRs) of randomized 
trials is ranked the most trustworthy—“SRs, by combining all relevant randomized 
trials, further reduce both bias and random error and thus provide the highest level of 
evidence currently achievable about the effects of health care.” (Sacket at all 2000, 
134). 
study yields a result depending on two sets of situations: the characteristics of the 
population examined and the design of the experiment (for instance, sample size, 
sample selection procedure, etc).  While each study aims to measure the fixed or 
variable population characteristics in question by using a nearly ideal experimental 
design, in reality a study achieves this goal only with errors, accruing from parameter 
and sampling variations as well as from possible flaws and biases in its experimental 
design.  However, since the goal in each study is the same, namely, finding the true 
characteristics of the same population, the project of a study is analogous to that of a 
judge who is asked to pass a judgment on the truth or falsity of a specific charge in 
the setting of the Condorcet Jury Theorem.  Meta-analyses can thus be seen as a type 
of aggregation of judgments of different research groups working on similar issues, 
where each group generates its evidence for or against a claim.   
My goal in this paper is to see the extent to which judgment aggregation 
methods subsume meta-analytic ones.  To this end, I derive a generalized version of 
the classical Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT), the aggregative implications of which 
have been widely exploited in the area of rational choice theory, but not yet in 
philosophy of science.  According to the theorem the French philosopher Condorcet 
developed in the hopes of improving the French tribunal system, under some plausible 
assumptions, the probability that the majority of judges makes a correct decision gets 
arbitrarily close to unity when the size of the tribunal increases.  This theorem 
acquired new currency in the twentieth century attempts to develop quantitative 
models of group decision-making.  My contention is that the generalized CJT that I 
prove below is also useful for modelling at least some meta-analytic procedures.  I 
conclude by examining the presuppositions and shortcomings of this model. 
Even though the CJT does not necessitate a Bayesian analysis of evidence, I 
employ the latter in order to evaluate the properties of the inferential framework I 
present.  This gives me the liberty to talk in the same breath both of the acceptance or 
rejection of a hypothesis--that is, an action space in the manner of classical 
statisticians--as well as a rational agent’s degrees of belief about propositions.   I spell 
out the details of this double use in the course of my exposition below. 
 
2. A Condorcet Jury Theorem for Meta-analyses 
A meta-analysis is carried out by retrieving and combining the evidence—almost 
always the final results rather than the basic data—provided by different primary 
studies, with a view to assessing the overall support for or against a hypothesis in a 
research area.2  This procedure is not needed in highly theoretical sciences, such as 
physics or chemistry, where replications of experiments do not usually exceed a 
handful, if at al, but meta-analyses are widely used in less theoretical and more 
empirical sciences, where experimental findings cannot be easily aligned to possible 
theoretical considerations.3  Thus, numerous studies have been carried out to examine 
the relation between cancer risks and diet, the efficacy of teaching methods in 
                                                        
2 For a popular introduction, see (Hunt 1997) and (Light and Pilllemer 1984).  For the 
statistical methods used, see (Cooper et al 1994), (Hedges and Olkin 1985) and 
(Hunter and Schmidt 1990).  For a criticism of the quantitative spirit it involves, see 
(Hammersley 2001). 3 As Nancy Cartwright observes, “In physics there is a rich network of knowledge and 
a great deal of connectedness so that any one hypothesis will have a large number of 
different consequences by different routes to which it is answerable.  This is generally 
not true of hypotheses in the social sciences. In social sciences, we need techniques to 
export conclusions from where they are confirmed to across the board”.  (Cartwright 
2007, 74).  Cartwright holds that in social sciences there is no rigorous justification 
for exporting results from the populations and situations in which they are established.  
 
mathematics education, etc.  These studies need not be replications of each other—
they usually sample from different populations, use different research designs, and 
moreover may address different sets of questions.  In meta-analyses, at least one 
question or issue is singled out and the cumulative evidence concerning that issue is 
assessed, pooling results from studies that satisfy some explicitly stated criteria of 
inclusion concerning experimental design.   
A simple model for this kind of post-data analysis is the following:  Let H 
stand for the hypothesis that is tested, and suppose there are n studies, each of which 
provides a binary evaluation of H, for instance, accepting H or rejecting H.  We can 
codify each study outcome as an indicator function Si which takes the value 1 if the ith 
study accepts H or 0 if the ith study rejects H.  As it is customary in statistical tests 
with a pre-data evaluation scheme, the probabilities with which these values are 
realized conditional on whether H is or is not the case can be specified as an error-
statistical property of the primary testing procedure—the first corresponds to the 
reliability (=1-size) and the second to the power of the test.  Suppose that there is a 
good estimate of the reliability and the power of each study, so that for each i=1, …, 
n, the following are well-defined probabilities: 
P(Si =1| H)=ri.  
P(Si =0| ¬ H)=si. 
Even though the above assumptions derive from the framework of standard classical 
tests, in which the probability measure P is regarded objective, I believe there is no 
reason not to consider P as measuring the degrees of beliefs of an agent appraising the 
test design for the hypothesis H.   
How can we merge the information from n such binary test results which may 
possibly—and in practice typically—yield incongruous results?  Here is an analysis 
inspired by the classical CJT:  Let S(n)=S1+…+Sn, so that S(n) counts the number of 
studies which accept H.  Note that S(n) is a random variable, the conditional 
distribution of which given H (or given ¬ H) can be expressed in terms of ri’s (or si’s).  
Assume that the primary studies are independent from one another, conditional on the 
truth value of H.4  Even though the independence condition can be relaxed in favor of 
a limited amount of dependence between the primary tests, I will not consider this 
more general case here partly for lack of space but mostly for the sake of highlighting 
the generalization to CJT that I propose.5  If we further assume  
(1) uniform reliability, that is, r1=…=rn=r 
then S(n) has the binomial distribution b(r, n) conditional on H.  Similarly, if we 
assume  
(2) uniform sensitivity, that is, s1=…=sn=s 
then S(n) has the binomial distribution b(1-s, n) conditional on ¬ H.  By the (weak) 
law of large numbers, if we assume (1), then S(n)/n approaches in probability to r, 
given H.  Similarly, if (2) is assumed, then S(n)/n approaches in probability to 1-s, 
given ¬ H.  In terms of formulae this means: 
a)  If (1), given any ε > 0, 
 
converges to 1 as n tends to infinity.   
Similarly,  
                                                        
4 I discuss the implications of this condition further below. 
5 To see generalizations of the CJT in this direction, see (Hawthorne 1991) and 
(Resnick 1998, 270-74). 
b) if (2), given any ε > 0,   converges to 1 as n tends to 
infinity.  
Suppose that after surveying n primary studies, one decides to accept H if and 
only if the frequency of acceptances exceeds a fixed ratio c.  This decision rule 
induces a new random variable An, which I will refer to as the c-aggregation rule, with 
the following indicator function:  
 
There may be several other aggregation rules, for instance those based on absolute 
thresholds, but for simplicity I examine only this one in this paper.  Due to the 
conditional asymptotic behavior of S(n)/n mentioned above, it can be shown easily 
that we have the following results:  
i) If (1) holds and c < r, then P(An=1 | H) converges to 1 as n tends to 
infinity. 
ii) If (1) holds and c > r, then P(An=1 | H) converges to 0 as n tends to 
infinity.  
iii) If (2) holds and c < 1-s, then P(An=0 | ¬H) converges to 0 as n tends to 
infinity. 
iv) If (2) holds and c > 1-s, then P(An=0 | ¬H) converges to 1 as n tends to 
infinity.6 
                                                        
6 See appendix for the proof. 
So a necessary and sufficient condition for An to yield asymptotic consistency with the 
true state of the world, that is, for it to be unbiased, is that (1) and (2) hold and the 
cut-off value c satisfies:  
1-s < c < r 7 
A necessary and sufficient condition for the last inequalities is that 1-s < r, or that 1 < 
s + r, given that the cut-off value c can be adjusted subsequently to the determination 
of error probabilities.  The classical Condorcet Jury Theorem is a special case when 
r=s>1/2, and c=1/2.8  The literature on the extensions of the CJT, as far as I know, 
accepts the condition r=s>1/2 unquestioningly, perhaps because in the rational choice 
theory applications it is customary to assume competent decision makers in this 
minimal sense.  In the meta-analysis application that I envision, we do not need to 
assume such ‘competent’ primary tests.  A primary study can be considered good 
enough if for that study the related reliability and sensitivity satisfy: 1 < s + r.  Thus a 
primary study with reliability 0.9 and sensitivity 0.2 can be pooled for the purposes of 
this kind of meta-analysis, if one uses, for instance, an 0.85-aggregation rule. 
 One can similarly investigate the asymptotic behavior of P(H| An=1) and 
P(¬H| An=0) as n tends to infinity.  These probabilities are crucial in a Bayesian 
analysis of the c-aggregation rule An, to assess whether an agent using this rule can 
succeed in evaluating the cumulative evidence for H correctly when n is sufficiently 
large.  Here I switch to the viewpoint of a rational agent whose degrees of belief 
                                                        
7 This follows from the observation that An is unbiased if and only if in the long run it 
indicates with nearly unit probability that H is (not) the case if H is (not) the case.  
The latter is equivalent to requiring that the results i) and iv) hold, while the results ii) 
and iii) do not. 
8 For a historical exposition of the CJT, see (Daston 1988, 340-352). 
concur with the error probabilities of primary tests.9  Assuming that this agent holds H 
with a prior probability x strictly between 0 and 1, we have by Bayes’s theorem: 
 
There are many sets of sufficient conditions for this quotient to converge to 1.  For 
instance, we can stipulate the following to ensure this: 
0 < x < 1; uniform sensitivity (i.e. condition (2)); c > 1-s; a positive lower 
bound on the posteriors of An=1, (for instance, liminfnP(An=1| H)≠ 0).10   
An analogous analysis shows that P(¬H | An=0) converges to 1 provided that 0< x <1; 
condition (1); c < r as well as something to the effect that liminfnP(An=0| ¬H) ≠ 0.  
 Conjoining these sets of sufficient conditions, it follows that the rational agent 
described above would be successful in the long run with her inferences on the basis 
of the c-aggregation rule, in the sense that this rule indicates her the truth or falsity of 
H with a high degree of probability, provided that the conditions 0 < x < 1; (1); (2) 
and 1-s < c < r  hold.  (Note that when we combine the two inequalities, it is 
guaranteed that liminfnP(An=1| H)≠ 0 and liminfnP(An=0| ¬H])≠ 0).  
                                                        
9 That a rational agent should do so can be argued on the basis of Lewis’s Principal 
Principle.  Of course, not being a theorem of the probability theory, the Principal 
Principle is an additional assumption available to those who seek to establish a 
plausible connection between degrees of belief and chances. 
10 These conditions jointly entail the result iv) above, as well as ensuring that the ratio 
in question is well-defined in the limit. 
One can further improve these findings by employing another generalized 
version of the CJT, where the uniformity of reliabilities (1) or of sensitivities (2) are 
weakened by the following conditions: 
 (1)’   
(2)’  
That is, instead of requiring uniformity of reliabilities and sensitivities of the studies, 
we require their convergence.  This is a more general condition that includes the 
former ones (i.e., (1) implies (1)’).11  In this setting, both consistency and the success 
of the c-aggregation rule in the long run are ensured on the condition that: 
 
Since the c-aggregation rule can be fixed after having some idea of the asymptotic 
behavior of si’s and ri’s, the crucial condition here is again the inequality 
. 
  
3.  Presuppositions of the Model 
The above model shows that instead of the sophisticated meta-analyses encountered 
in the literature, one can simply do a vote-counting analysis of primary studies if 
certain conditions are satisfied.  These are: 
a) Publication bias or other kinds of bias do not exist.                                                         
11 For a proof, see (Resnick 1998, 205). 
b) There are sufficiently many primary studies that are independent of each 
other (given the true state of the world). 
c) 1 < limiting reliability + limiting sensitivity. 
The first assumption is important not only for the application of this model to 
meta-analyses, but for any other meta-analytic practice as well.  Publication bias 
refers to the dependence of the publication of a research on its result.  Many scientific 
journals resist the publication of non-significant results (in the context of classical 
statistical tests).  If there is such a bias, then many, if not all, published results do not 
transmit information to the effect that H.  In other words, most of the studies which 
would signal S=1 are eliminated from the available pool of studies—in the meta-
analytic jargon this corresponds to the fugitive literature, most of which is (or used to 
be) kept in file-drawers.  If there is a publication bias, then  
P(S=1|H) ≠ P(S=1||H and S is published),  
and hence the above model cannot be applied to meta-analyses that retrieve only 
published results.  A related problem for the meta-analyst is accessing studies that are 
not published for other reasons than the publication bias, for instance, dissertations or 
government studies.  If such studies exhibit other sorts of tendencies in their results, 
then the meta-analyses which exclude them could not aspire to represent the total 
evidence.  Because the direction of bias can be accurately quantified from publication 
policy practices, statisticians have devised ways of detecting publication bias and 
corrections thereof (See, for instance, (Duval and Tweedie 2000).  My model, as it 
stands, cannot take into account corrections for these kinds of biases. 
Concerning the assumption on the number of studies, it is certainly unrealistic 
in many disciplines to assume there are even thousands of them.  Yet, the 
convergence rates of binomial variables are fairly rapid, and we can usually determine 
an upper bound on the number of studies needed to ensure desired levels of 
approximations to the limiting values.  Furthermore, in the current state of the art in 
empirical research, it would also be incorrect to underestimate the amount of 
quantitative primary research.  This is the day is of the empirics in the human 
sciences:  Scientific journals are awash in data; hospitals, schools and government 
offices are pouring figures and numbers, not to mention biotech and financial 
companies or myriads of other databases.  To give an example concerning the topic of 
the earliest meta-analysis of Smith and Glass in 1977, based on 375 studies, there 
have been so many follow-ups that some researchers had to meta-analyze the extant 
meta-analyses! Already in 1993 a vast study analyzed 302 meta-analyses of a total of 
nearly five thousand primary studies, followed by numerous other studies on the 
same.  The figures are ever on the rise. 12 
The second assumption, namely that the primary studies are independent from 
each other given the true state of the world, is usually the case.  Researchers may 
interact with each other but so long as they generate their own evidence and 
assessments through their research—which activity can be taken as definitive of 
primary research—we can treat their findings as independent verdicts on H.13  The 
fact that each primary research generates its own evidence is a feature that 
distinguishes this application of the generalized CJT from its standard applications in 
the rational choice theory.  In the original setting of the CJT, each judge evaluates the 
same body of evidence for the tribunal case at issue.  This is not so in the meta-
analytic practice, where each primary research creates a separate body of evidence                                                         
12 See (Hunt 1997, 43). 
13 See (Hawthorne 2001) for a similar point about CJT. 
regarding the hypothesis H.  As my model indicates, however, there is no need to 
assume that the same body of evidence is available to each primary researcher.  The 
independence assumption prevents duplications of a single study (for instance, 
reported in different sources) being treated as different pieces of research, but it does 
not block replications of the same experiment (carried on different samples or even on 
the same sample but with different experimental design) to count as different pieces 
of research.  Standard meta-analyses also include the latter. 
What if each primary research is systematically biased because of some 
flawed background assumptions or measurement procedures?  History of science is 
full of episodes where many conceptual, interpretative or practical commitments of 
scientific communities prevented them from seeing through the veil of paradigms.  
One should then not expect to infer from unanimous agreement on H (i.e., when 
S(n)=n) to H with full assurance.  There are several ways in which the CJT type 
model above can be refined to capture this situation.  The simplest way would be to 
incorporate all such shared background assumptions as a statement B on which the 
agents conditionalize their beliefs.  In other words, instead of using the probability 
measure P,  one can use the probability measure P(  |B) or in more compact notation, 
PB.  If the reliabilities and the sensitivities measured with PB still satisfy the crucial 
conditions stated in the above model, then the same conclusions would ensue.  The 
heart of the problem is whether one can indeed quantify reliabilities and sensitivities 
with the same accuracy when B is assumed to distort assessments of how raw data or 
evidence bears on hypotheses.14  I believe this is a problem, not only for my model but 
also for any meta-analysis. 
 The third assumption points to another problem that may arise in the test 
designs of primary studies.  Each pair of numbers ri and si have to do with the error 
characteristics of the ith study.  In the design of classical statistical tests, one of these 
numbers is first fixed at a desirable level and then the other is optimized later.  In 
other words, one usually cannot design a test in which both of these values are preset 
at any two desirable levels.  Hence, usually one and only one of the assumptions (1)’ 
or (2)’ can be realized in practice. Precisely because of this, it is not a priori certain 
that , even though one may grant that for many tests 1- si < ri , as the former 
quantity stands for Type II error and the latter for the reliability (=1-Type I error) of a 
test.  Notoriously, many significance tests have very low power, and the above 
inequality would not hold for such tests.  On the other hand, we may take the 
condition 1- si < ri  as one of the inclusion criteria of a meta-analysis.  In other words, 
if the condition 1- si < ri is not satisfied for a primary study, that study may be 
excluded from the meta-analytic review, a requirement that statisticians would 
probably concur with. 
  
                                                        
14 Another way to solve this problem is suggested in (Dietrich and List 2004). Instead 
of modeling the meta-analytic procedure as an evaluation of all sorts of possible 
evidence the world presents to the researchers, we can model it as an evaluation of the 
body of possible evidence the research findings exhibit with constraints deriving from 
paradigmatic commitments.  The difference amounts to determining whether the 
world was the immediate cause of the results Si’s or whether the evidential framework E preempts the world’s input.  If the latter is the case, then it can be inserted as a new 
random variable E between the state of the world {H, ¬H} and the study outcomes 
Si’s in such a way that E screens off the former in Si’s ancestry.  In this case, the 
convergence results mentioned in my model should be modified so that they reveal in 
the limit the misleading role of E.   
4. Conclusion 
The model I propose is too simple, and thereby has both advantages and 
disadvantages.  To start with, the vote-counting method is not too selective about 
experimental design.  This can be seen as an advantage when the dispute over the 
nature of best experimental designs--for instance, between Bayesians and classical 
statisticians—is taken into account.  Yet, this is also a disadvantage.  The most serious 
shortcoming of this model is that it assumes all primary studies are on a par so long as 
their error probabilities satisfy the condition 1<r+s.   Yet, a proper meta-analysis 
begins by classifying the included primary studies with a view to rank them on the 
basis of their experimental design.  In the current practice of meta-analysis in many 
disciplines, RCTs with larger samples are given more weight than small-scale studies, 
or non-randomized studies.  The scientific community would rightly hesitate between 
accepting the result of a meta-analysis and a conflicting result from a new large-scale 
study.15  They would not treat the latter study as having merely one nth of a vote.  I do 
not suggest that vote-counting always gets us closer to truth, but there may be ways to 
address this problem.  One way is to follow the procedure of a proper meta-analysis 
by first stratifying the extant research using some epistemic values, and then applying 
my model to each stratum separately.  That will work provided that there are 
sufficiently many primary studies in each category of the hierarchy.   Another 
shortcoming of my model is that it cannot be used to determine effect size, the 
quantity most current primary research is driven to reveal.  Another issue about which 
my model is silent is the discovery of new evidence through the meta-analytic 
                                                        
15 This situation is quite frequently the case in clinical research.  As (Ioannidis 2006) 
counts, 16% of highly cited primary research was plainly contradicted by subsequent 
research, and another 16% was found to have exaggerated the effects of medical 
interventions. 
practice, when statisticians are keen to determine the reasons for conflicting results by 
conjecturing and testing for moderator variables.  No doubt, any binary evaluation of 
the results of primary studies is doomed to dissipate valuable information deriving 
from empirical research.16  On the other hand, we have to find ways to extract 
information from the ever-increasing profusion of empirical research.  We live in an 
era of massive efforts to collect data, on scales unimaginable until one century or so, 
and it may be expedient to extract reliable evidence from data in simple and 
manageable ways.  What I have in mind is in the spirit of explorative data analysis 
envisioned by the statistician John W. Tukey.  Sometimes stem-and-leaf plots are 
more informative than sophisticated mathematical tools.17  I believe that sometimes, 
and at least under the conditions specified in the above model, simple judgment 
aggregation procedures can subsume meta-analysis.  
Appendix 
In order to prove i), note that when c < r, we have the following: 
 
                                                        
16 Cooper (1994, 24) distinguishes between “review-generated evidence,” and the 
“study-generated evidence” to highlight the significance of the former.  Review-
generated evidence may include the gender of the researchers and the publication date 
(of primary studies).  
17 Tukey’s project was precisely to de-emphasize formal mathematics in data analysis. 
See (Donoho 2000) for an assessment of Tukey and the future of data analysis. 
When in addition (1) holds, as mentioned in the text, the last expression converges to 
1 when n tends to infinity.  This establishes the same for P(An=1|H). 
To prove ii), assume c > r, and note the following: 
 
If (1) holds, then the last quantity converges to 0, and hence so does P(An=1|H).  The 
remaining results iii) and iv) can be proved in an analogous fashion by replacing c 
with 1-s, and H with its negation. 
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